We give an auction for downward-closed environments that generalizes the random sampling profit extraction auction for digital goods of Fiat et al. (2002) . The mechanism divides the agents in to a market and a sample using a biased coin and attempts to extract the optimal revenue from the sample from the market. The latter step is done with the downward-closed profit extractor of Ha and Hartline (2012) . The auction is a 11-approximation to the envyfree benchmark in downward-closed permutation environments. This is an improvement on the previously best known results of 12.5 for matroid and 30.4 for downward-closed permutation environments that are due to Devanur et al. (2012) and Ha and Hartline (2012), respectively.
Lemma 1 (Ha and Hartline, 2012) . For downward-closed permutation environments there is a profit extractor parameterized byṽ that obtains from v at least the envy-free optimal revenue forṽ if v ≥ṽ and otherwise rejects all agents.
An unbiased partitioning of agents into a market M and sample S would be very unlikely to satisfy pointwise dominance v M ≥ v S as necessary for the profit extractor of Lemma 1 on v M to give revenue at least EFO(v S ). On the other hand, a simple probability of ruin analysis shows that a biased partitioning satisfies the requisite pointwise dominance property with constant probability.
Lemma 2. For partitioning of N into S (with probability p < 1/2) and M (otherwise) satisfies
Proof. Consider the following infinite random walk on a straight line: starting from position 0, with probability p, move backward one step; otherwise, move forward one step. The position of this random walk describes precisely the difference between the number of agents in M and S, where positive value means M has more agents than S. The event v M ≥ v S happens when there exists a time that M has less agents than S. Let r be the probability that the random walk eventually takes one step backward from the initial position, we have r = p + (1 − p)r 2 . The first component is the probability of taking one step backward in the first step, and the second component is the probability of the first step being a forward step, then eventually take two steps backward. Solving this equation for r ∈ (0, 1) gives r = p/(1 − p). When we condition on 1 ∈ M , our initial position is 1 not 0 and the probability of ruin is r 2 . If we stop the random walk after finite number n of steps, it only improves the probability of ruin.
The random sampling profit extraction auction is formally given below with a few modifications for improved performance.
Definition 1 (BSPE p ). The biased sampling profit extraction auction parameterized by p < 0.5 works as follow.
1. Randomly assign each of the agents to one of three groups A, B, and C independently with probabilities p, p, and 1 − 2p, respectively. 5. If all agents are rejected by the profit extractor and it is feasible to serve agent 1 (the highest valued agent over all), serve her and charge her v 2 .
Lemma 3 (Incentive Compatibility). For all probabilities p, BSPE p is incentive compatible.
Proof. Fix the partitioning of A, B, and C. No agent in M can change the definition of sets M and S without losing (thus obtaining zero utility). No agent in S can change the definition of sets M and S without obtaining a payment of at least her value (from the parenthetical in Step 2, thus obtaining non-positive utility). Therefore no agent wants to manpulate the definition of M and S. For given M and S this mechanism is the profit extraction mechanism which is incentive compatible for fixed M and S. Only the highest valued agent would want to win in Step 5; furthermore, she cannot cause dominance to fail without lowering her bid (and forfeiting her status as the highest bidder).
Lemma 4. The envy-free benchmark EFO(v) for a random sample S of N with each element selected independently with probability p satisfies E EFO(v S ) ≥ p EFO(v).
Proof. Consider the envy-free optimal outcome for v. Clearly if we restrict attention only to agents in S there is still no envy. Therefore, EFO(v S ) ≥ EFO S (v) where EFO S (v) is short-hand notation for the contribution from agents in S to the envy-free optimal revenue on v. Of course,
Lemma 5. For any downward-closed permutation environment and any probability p < 0.5, 2
1. BSPE p approximates EFO(v −1 ) to within a factor of p −
2. BSPE p approximates EFO(v 2 ) to within a factor of p + (1 − p)p 3 when there are n ≥ 5 agents.
Proof. To show part 1 of the lemma, we will focus on the revenue obtainable via the profit extraction step. Lemma 1 says that we would obtain at least EFO(v S ) when v M ≥ v S . Thus the expected revenue is at least:
The second inequality warrants some explanation: the first term follows from applying Lemma 4 to v −1 , the second term follows from monotonicity of EFO.
To show part 2 of the lemma, we analize the event that player 2 is in the sample and the event that the market pointwise dominates the sample. With probability p agent 2 is in the sample and EFO(v S ) ≥ EFO(v 2 ). If the market pointwise dominates the sample then the mechanism obtains this revenue; otherwise, the revenue from agent 1 via Step 5 is at least EFO(v 2 ). With probability (1 − p) agent 2 is in the market and the probability of v M ≥ v S (implying that the profit extractor fails) is at least p 3 by stepping backward three steps in a row (possible when there are more than 5 agents); in this case again the revenue from agent 1 via Step 5 is at least EFO(v 2 ). To conclude, the revenue of the mechanism it at least:
Theorem 1. For any downward-closed permutation environment with probability p < 0.5 and n ≥ 5 agents, 3 BSPE p approximates EFO(v (2) ) within a factor of r 1 +r 2 r 1 r 2 where r 1 = p − p 1−p 2 and r 2 = p + (1 − p)p 3 . This factor is minimized at 11 when p = 0.26.
Proof. EFO(v 2 ) + EFO(v −1 ) ≥ EFO(v (2) ) due to subadditivity of EFO function as shown by Hartline and Yan (2011) . Combining with the above lemma, we have the desired ratio.
